|
Menu |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Profits of war |
|
By Khaled Diab The economic rewards of peace are supposed to lure Israelis and
Palestinians away from conflict. But what if war is its own reward? |
|
January
2009 The
heart-wrenching carnage and humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza – and the mass
fear in southern Israel – is made all the more tragic by the fact that it
seems to follow a well-rehearsed script of tense silences followed by sudden,
spasmodic eruptions of violence. Just as
the war against Lebanon in 2006 was as shocking as it was sudden and was
triggered by the flimsiest of pretexts, the reinvasion of Gaza has also
struck like a whirlwind. And just like Lebanon in 2006 and 1982 – as well as
the reinvasions of the Palestinian territories following the outbreak of the
al-Aqsa intifada and the election victory
of Hamas – the current campaign is unlikely to bring Israelis anything more
than a little tense respite. Like
Hamas, which seems incapable of realising the futility of armed struggle and
declaring a non-violent peace movement, Israel appears to be completely
beholden to the logic of the battering ram. This raises the question of why
it is that, despite all the evidence that overwhelming force simply does not
work, Israel still has not abandoned its prized “deterrence” policy. The
tragedy in Gaza could be seen as a desperate bid by Israel to reassert its sense of
lost deterrence, or simply as another cynical
bid by the Kadima leadership to boost their ailing popularity before next
month’s elections. But there
are many other factors at play, too. In the past, I’ve explored the role of
ideology, including what I call the ‘God
veto’, political
fragmentation and psychological
barriers in perpetuating the conflict. In addition to these, there is an
increasingly prominent economic dimension. At one
time, war for Israel meant economic paralysis and crisis, but was sustained
by a mesmerising ideology, the fresh memory of persecution and a large array
of potentially frightening enemies. But even with Israel as the undisputed
regional military superpower and its former enemies falling one by one by the
wayside, Israeli violence has risen significantly in recent years, especially
towards the Palestinians. This is partly
because a durable peace with the Palestinians requires more fundamental
compromises than with the Egyptians and Jordanians as a fair settlement
raises issues that strike at the heart of Zionism. Another reason is that,
after so many generations, conflict has not only become intrinsically
interwoven into Israel’s social fabric, it has also become hardwired into its
economy. During
the Oslo years, Shimon Peres – who favoured a “peace of markets” before a
“peace of flags” – and the Labour party were backed by influential members of
the business community who were lured by the peace dividend Israel could earn
from a resolution to the conflict. But under rightwing stewardship in recent
years, the Israeli economy has been profiting from its own and global conflict
and insecurity. In fact,
for the past few years, Israel has enjoyed one of the highest economic growth
rates in the world, and is still registering healthy growth
even as western economies falter. Much of this growth has been fuelled by the
high-tech ‘Silicon Wadi’
sector, much of it security-related technologies, and arms. According
to the Israel Export and International Co-operation Institute, security
and homeland security exports reached $3 billion in 2005. In 2007, Israel
overtook Britain to become the world’s fourth largest weapons
exporter, selling a total of $4 billion in arms. On top of
that, since the bursting of the dot-com bubble, Israel has boosted its
military spending, partly to help salvage high-tech firms. Last year, proved
to be yet another record year, with the country’s defence budget
subsuming a massive 16% of government spending and 7% of GDP. Add to that,
the average $3 billion in military
aid which Israel receives from the United States each year, and you have
a truly staggering economic dependence on the way of the gun. This is
not to say that this is necessarily a war dividend for Israel as a whole, but
those involved wield a powerful lobby. In addition, Israel does not seem to
be paying a massive war premium. High-tech industries do not require Israel
to be on good terms with its neighbours, while with most western economies,
it’s business as usual, regardless of the political situation on the ground.
The EU, as a whole, remains Israel’s main trading partner, with bilateral
trade at around €20 billion, followed closely by the United States. Moreover,
low-intensity flare-ups seem to give the markets some welcome jolts. Between
27 December, when the Gaza offensive began, and 5 January, the benchmark TA-25
stock index climbed an impressive 8.7%. Similarly, the index gained 3.6%
in July 2006 during the Lebanon campaign. In addition, Israel and the
occupied territories are slowly being transformed into macabre
showcases for security products. Israel
has even managed to wean itself off its dependence on Palestinian labour,
with the massive influx of Russian Jews who arrived in massive numbers in the
1990s. This has enabled Israel to close off the Palestinian territories
without feeling major economic pain itself. In contrast to Israel, the
massive economic deterioration – along with the political deadlock –
triggered by the mass closures that began in the Oslo years, suggested to
many Palestinians that the quest for peace would not deliver them a dividend,
a frustration which culminated in the second intifada. In
addition, while a small elite profits from the political instability and
insecurity, the ongoing conflict serves the additional purpose of distracting ordinary
Israelis from the growing levels of poverty into which they are
descending – much like Arab leaders have exploited the demise of
Palestinians. In
conclusion, a sort of alignment of convenience has emerged between
influential segments of Israel’s economic elite and ideological opponents of
the peace process. Add to that, the revolving door between the military and
the upper echelons of politics and industry, and the “war economy” locomotive
appears even harder to derail. This
column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section
on 11 January 2009. Read the related
discussion. ãCopyright 2009 – Khaled Diab. Unless otherwise stated, all the content on this
website is the copyright of Khaled Diab. |