Getting
to the grassroots of the Middle East conflict
By Khaled Diab and
Katleen Maes
March 2006
Part II: The end of
the road for unilateralism?
The Kadima
(Forward/Vanguard) Party cruised to victory in a lacklustre election, while the
party’s founder, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, lay in a coma – which he slipped
into following a massive stroke on 4 January – in Jerusalem’s Hadassa Hospital.
The election campaign was led by Sharon’s faithful minion Ehud Olmert, who
defected with him from the then ruling Likud Party, which imploded at the
ballot box, dealing a major blow to the settler movement.
Olmert, the
unpopular former mayor of Jerusalem, has indicated that he will continue
Sharon’s legacy. Last year, Sharon – the mastermind behind settlement expansion
when he was housing minister – went against the will of many members of his
rightwing Likud Party and pulled 8,500 settlers out of the Gaza Strip.
Despite the
tears and pain of the settler movement, the decision resonated positively among
a significant proportion of Israelis, who oppose settlements for a variety of
security, economic and even idealistic reasons. Although Palestinians
distrusted the motives of Sharon, whom they regard as a war criminal, most
welcomed the move as a good first step.
Partial
settlements
As one of the
authors of the current article hypothesised in her 2003 thesis[1],
settlements have the unique quality of being both one of the major stumbling
blocks – alongside the status of Jerusalem and the right of return for
Palestinian refugees and diaspora Palestinians – on the path to peace, while
being unpopular amongst both Palestinians and Israelis. This means that
uprooting some of them can only help to alleviate tension between the two
parties and has the potential of being a good confidence builders.
Researched
and written at the height of the second intifada – which began in 2000 – the
thesis found that the best way out of the deadlock was “experimental, unilateral initiative taking”. The research suggested
that there was a groundswell of support among Palestinians and Israelis for the
idea not only of a settlement freeze but the immediate dismantling of certain
troublesome settlements and the removal of ideological settlers, particularly
those living in settlement outposts.
Such a
gesture would play well amongst Palestinians who are fundamentally opposed to
Israel’s settlements, which are illegal under international law and regarded by
Palestinians as creating ‘realities on the ground’. Any Israeli pullout would
suggest Israeli seriousness about the prospects of a Palestinian state.
For Israelis,
their objections are much more varied. The leftwing peace movement is opposed
to settlements on legal and idealistic grounds, i.e. that they are illegal
under international law, require an oppressive occupation to maintain them and
tarnish Israel’s image abroad. Progressive thinkers also have an instinctive
distrust of fundamentalist settlers. For mainstream Israelis, their objections
often revolve around the economic, human and security costs of the occupation,
although many ordinary Israelis are also perturbed by the sway over their
secular-leaning country held by the ultra-orthodox wing of the settler
movement.
Given
the bitterness of the situation, the thesis argued that: “The reasons for any
party to take action would be mainly selfish, with the objective of preventing
further harm to its own civilians. At the same time, the action should also be
in the interest of the other side, in order to reduce the tension.”
Israel, being
in the more powerful position, and with more cards to play, needed to make a
clear gesture. The Israelis and Palestinians interviewed largely agreed that
the “easiest option, and hence the most realistic
one, would be to pull out the settlers in Gaza”.
The value of
selfish pragmatism
Ariel Sharon
did not shed his fervent nationalist skin overnight and metamorphose into a
peacenik. He just awoke to the realisation that his strategic vision was
failing. It had consisted of “dismantling the legacy of Labour: reversing the
results of the Oslo process and reasserting Israel’s control over the occupied
Palestinian territories, and reshaping the Israeli economy according to an
extreme neo-liberal model”, according to Yoav Peled, a political science
professor at Tel Aviv University.
All his
militaristic attempts to crush the second intifada – which he helped spark by
visiting the al-Aqsa Mosque complex in September 2000 with hundreds of soldiers
– and reoccupy the Palestinian territories ultimately failed and the cycle of
violence continued unabated. He also failed to distribute the fruits of
Israel’s impressive economic growth equitably, not to mention the dismal
humanitarian and economic situation in the Palestinian territories, where 30% of
people are unemployed and nearly half of the population lives under the poverty
line on less than $2 per day, according to the World Bank.
The Israeli
wealth gap has widened so much that, according to Peled, 30% of economic income
accrued to the top 10% of the population. Israel now resembles the stark
socio-economic contrasts of its main sponsor, the United States, rather than
the more socialist European ideals upon which it was founded.
Faced with
his failure to deliver physical or economic security, the desperate premier –
whose son was embroiled in corruption allegations – went against his natural
instinct and borrowed two policy ideas originally thought up by Labour
politicians: evacuating Gaza and building the separation wall.
“Sharon’s
policy was not intended to make peace or even resume negotiations with the
Palestinians. It was intended simply to make Israel’s occupation of Palestinian
lands more economical, in terms of Jewish blood and money,” noted Peled.
Kadima’s
manifesto confirms that Sharon did not change his stripes, he just become more
pragmatic. It asserts that Jews have “national and historic right to the Land
of Israel in its entirety”. However, in a reality check, it begrudgingly
concedes that: “The balance between allowing Jews to fulfil their historic
right... and maintaining the continued existence of Israel as the national
Jewish home necessitates territorial compromise.”
Thus,
although the Gaza pullout was motivated primarily by self-interest, the
by-product for the Palestinian side was also positive.
The
short-term virtue of dancing to your own tune
Kadima has
been crowned to lead an Israeli coalition government, while a party set up by
Hamas is leading the new coalition governing the dysfunctional and weak
Palestinian Authority. With each party dancing in isolation to its own tune,
there is potential, in the short term, either for mutually beneficial or
mutually detrimental unilateralism. If Israel keeps up its counterproductive
economic stranglehold on the Palestinians, this could force Hamas’s hand,
leading the Islamist party to start talking and acting tougher. It would then
re-spark the vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence, recrimination and
counter-recrimination.
Alternatively,
if Israel agrees to unfreeze Palestinian tax receipts and begins to deliver
more evacuations, this could breed a virtuous cycle of unilateral goodwill
gestures. Hamas has indicated its willingness to play this game. As hard-headed
and nationalistic as Israel’s own religious parties and the Likud, Hamas has
toned down its position since it won the election. Immediately after its
victory, it said it was willing to call an indefinite truce, if Israel pulls
back to its 1967 borders. “We can accept to establish our independent state on
the area occupied [in] 1967,” Mahmoud al-Zahar, a top Hamas official and one of
its last surviving founders, told CNN.
Ismail
Haniyeh, the new Palestinian prime minister and leading Hamas leader, said
encouragingly: “We don’t want a whirlpool of blood in this region. We want the
rights and dignity of our people. We also want to put an end to this
complicated conflict that has been going on for decades… Hamas’s presence in
power marks the beginning of resolving the crisis.”
This announcement caused something of a stir in
some circles. “This is the first time a Hamas leader has spoken about the
possibility of ending the conflict with Israel,” wrote Gershon Baskin, the
Israeli co-director of the Israel-Palestine Centre for Research and
Information, in the Jerusalem Post. “It raises serious questions regarding the
wisdom of Israel’s policy of unilateralism.”
Part II: The end of
the road for unilateralism?
ă2006 K. Diab. Unless otherwise stated, all the content on this website
is the copyright of Khaled Diab.
[1] Talking
settlements – reviving the Israeli-Palestinian will for peace by Katleen Maes, 2003, Katholieke Universiteit van Leuven.