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Disarming the bomb in the basement |
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By Khaled Diab Israel’s weapons policy jeopardises the country’s own security and undermines efforts to create a nuclear-free Middle East. |
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September
2008 Israel’s
interior minister Meir Sheetrit – who is vying to take over
the reins from outgoing prime minister Ehud Olmert – has struck a welcome
note of caution on Iran in his campaign for the ruling Kadima party’s
leadership. On Wednesday, he said: “Israel
must on no account attack Iran, speak of attacking Iran or even think about
it… Israel must defend itself only if attacked by Iran, but attacking Iran on
our own initiative is a megalomaniacal [and] reckless idea.” Earlier,
former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy also struck alarm bells
against calls to bomb Iran. He warned
that an attack could hurt Israel’s interests for a century. “It will
have a negative effect on public opinion in the Arab world.” In fact, the ex-intelligence chief’s opinion is that, without doing
anything, Israel wins anyway. “Ahmadinejad is our greatest gift,” he told
the US-sponsored Arabic-language network al-Hurra on Tuesday. “We couldn’t
carry out a better operation at the Mossad than to put a guy like Ahmadinejad
in power in Iran.” According to Time magazine, another senior Mossad official opined
that: “Iran’s achievement is creating an image of itself as a scary
superpower when it’s really a paper tiger.” Although these statements, as well as reported US opposition and murmurs
of dissent in Tehran against the regime’s posturing on Israel, reduce the
possibility of a military confrontation for the time being, tensions could
flare up at any time. “Paper tiger” or not, Tehran’s strident rhetoric is fuelling public
fear in Israel, which plays into the hands of hardliners. In addition, Israel
may not trust Iran’s reassurances about its civilian nuclear intentions
because Israel itself gave similar assurances but, nevertheless, went on to
acquire a nuclear weapons capability. In fact, Israel’s quest to become a nuclear power started shortly
after independence, and the main driving force behind it was the country’s
founding father, David Ben Gurion. The Israeli leader – who admitted to
having nightmares about “a combined attack by all the Arab armies”, despite
Israel possessing more firepower than all the Arab countries combined – saw
nuclear weapons as the main way of ensuring Israel’s strategic security. Like
Iran, he was also lured by the prestige factor of joining the nuclear club. Following
the Suez fiasco, Ben Gurion became more adamant. However, many senior
officials opposed his nuclear designs for a number of reasons: they feared it
would spark a dangerous escalation, draw resources away from conventional
forces and cripple the struggling Israeli economy. Despite
this opposition, Ben Gurion, whose status allowed him to circumvent the
cabinet and the Knesset, struck a landmark deal with France in 1957 to build
a large reactor that could separate plutonium. Concerned at where this was
leading, all but one of the members of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission
resigned in protest at the growing military orientation of the programme. Although
the Dimona reactor was constructed in great secrecy, with not even a whisper
in the Israeli press, word leaked out and, in December 1960, rumours spread
in the western press and were confirmed by U2 spy planes. This triggered
concern in Washington and Moscow, and fear and condemnation in the Arab
world. The news also took the Israeli public by complete surprise. Ben Gurion
assured the world that the reactor was “designed exclusively for peaceful
purposes”. It was
around this time that Israel formulated its policy of nuclear ambiguity.
Faced with international criticism and internal opposition, the legendary
military leader Moshe Dayan developed the concept of what he ominously called
“the bomb in the basement”. Israel
began its line that it would not be the first to “introduce” nuclear weapons
into the region. Pressed on what exactly that meant, the then ambassador to
Washington, Yitzhak Rabin, vaguely responded that Israel would not be the
first to “test” such weapons. Israel
resisted international supervision under the IAEA and only grudgingly agreed
to pre-arranged American inspections to limited sections of the Dimona
facility which, critics argued, allowed it to hide the military activity at
the reactor behind false walls. Experts
estimate that Israel acquired a nuclear capability shortly after the 1967 war
and today possesses up to 200 nuclear war heads, putting it among the top six
nuclear nations, just behind the UK. Interestingly,
a 1963 CIA report
predicted that a nuclear Israel would polarise and destabilise the region and
would likely make: “Israel’s policy with its neighbours… more, rather than
less, tough”. The report also touched on the attendant dangers, such as a
possible Arab quest for their own “deterrent”, as well as the damage to
western interests in the region. And, as
long as Israel holds on to its nuclear arsenal, the shadow of proliferation
will not go away. For at least thirty years, Arab governments, as well as
Iran, have been pushing for a nuclear weapons-free Middle East. If Israel is
concerned about a nuclear Iran, or the possibility that other regimes in the
region will acquire the bomb, the best way it can avert this is to offer to
phase out its nuclear arsenal in return for cast-iron Iranian assurances
under international supervision. This
column appeared in The Guardian Unlimited’s Comment is Free section
on 24 August 2008. Read the related
discussion. |
ã2008
– Khaled Diab. Unless otherwise stated, all the content on this website is the
copyright of Khaled Diab.