Menu Back
issues About
Diabolic Digest
Why set menus for Middle East peace do not work
By Katleen Maes
“Why
all the fuss?” was the question recently asked on the pages of the Globe
and Mail, a liberal Canadian daily, regarding US President George Bush’s
support for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s latest unilateral blow to
prospects for peace in the Middle East.
May 2004
Had the question been posed by a Washington or
a Likud hawk, one could have ignored it. But the article’s authors were, in
fact, Former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and former Clinton Adviser
Robert Malley – both now at the respected think tank The International
Crisis Group, which launched the much talked about unofficial Geneva Peace
Accords. Although I whole-heartedly agree with their assertion that Bush cannot
choose Middle East peace a la carte, I find it hard to come to grips
with their rosy assessment that there was nothing amiss in Bush’s support for
Sharon’s latest tour de force.
Given his administration’s record, the content
of Bush’s message might not come as any surprise, but his unapologetically
one-sided support and rhetoric give plenty of cause for concern. Even if Bush
was simply, as the authors argue, providing Sharon with the domestic political
cover to pull out of Gaza, he is also effectively killing off his own Road Map
and the prospects of a fair peace deal in the spray of diplomatic shrapnel this
has caused.
It is true, as the article points out, that the
US-backed peace talks in Camp David and Taba in 2000-2001 did envision the
prospect of Israel holding on to some West Bank settlement blocks. But
this was still in the context of UN resolutions calling for Israeli withdrawal
to its pre-1967 borders.
But on 14 April 2004, a US president, for the
first time, wholeheartedly embraced the fact that “in light of new realities on
the ground”, it would be unrealistic to expect that all “already existing major
Israeli population centers” would be dismantled, without mentioning the land
Palestinians would get in return. The authors also conveniently overlook the
massive Jerusalem settlements that will separate the city from the West Bank on
three sides – effectively cutting off the disputed city from the Palestinians
while keeping silent on its ultimate status. The authors also fail to mention
the fact that Sharon wants to take the unprecedented step of keeping the
intrusive settlements in Hebron.
The same one-sidedness is apparent in Bush’s
position towards the 4 million Palestinian refugees when he ruled out their
right of return to Israel. While many Palestinians are willing to be pragmatic
on this point, they would only be willing to contemplate such a move in the
context of a fair compensation package.
This raises another important point: Is
Sharon’s ultimate goal to weaken the Palestinian leadership so much that there is
no party left on the other side to negotiate with? Emboldened by Bush’s
backing, he has placed his lifelong
archenemy Yasser Arafat in his sights once again, saying he is reneging on a
promise given to Bush that he would not harm the Palestinian president. This
comes hot on the heels of the Israeli double assassination of Hamas’ spiritual
leader Ahmed Yassin and, a few weeks later, his replacement Abdel-Aziz
Rantissi. Sharon has also tried to silence secular Palestinian leaders – such
as the high profile trial of Marwan Barghouti and now the pestering by police
of peace activist and head of Al Quds University Sari Nusseibeh.
An ultimatum or a plan?
This leads us to another reason for making a
fuss: Bush effectively gave away – as the authors themselves assert – what was
not his to give in the first place.
The Palestinian compromises made during
Clinton’s watch were made in the context of direct talks with their Israeli
counterparts. As the authors explain: “It is one thing for Palestinians to make
concessions in the context of bilateral negotiations… It is quite another for
the United States to cherry-pick from among the various compromises those that
the Palestinians will have to make.”
Despite their recognition of the importance of
bilateral talks, they urge Bush to “put forward a full blueprint for a final
settlement”. With his and Sharon’s record of roughshod unilateral militarism,
this seems like a reckless suggestion to make. It may even be unrealistic,
given the lack of real interest the Bush administration has in the Arab-Israeli
Peace process.
Robert Malley admits as much in a previous
article for French newspaper Le Monde. He says that the
‘internationalisation’ of the conflict is preferable to its
‘unilateralisation’. “But… it will have to wait until times, or at least
the administration, change.”[1]
Secondly, Malley and Evans, by proposing that
the U.S “put forward a full blueprint or a final settlement and seek broad
international backing for it”, seem to forgo their previous commitment to
home-grown people’s initiatives. However, I remain convinced the authors still
believe that “A process must be devised to give practical and political
expression to the heartfelt desire of clear majorities on both sides to end
this conflict once and for all.”[2]
I also beg to differ with the authors that the
United States enjoyed the status of impartial and credible broker until its 14
April statements. In the eyes of the international community, the United States
lost its credibility in the run up to the ongoing Iraq conflict. For many
ordinary Arabs, they have had difficulties seeing Washington as an impartial
broker for decades. However, many – if not all parties in the Middle East –
recognised the United States as the only realistic broker due to its sheer
power and influence. Now, even that real politick is being questioned.
As the informal ICG-backed Geneva talks showed,
a peaceful settlement can be achieved if the two sides are brought together in
the right climate. Within this framework, I believe that home grown
initiatives, under the guidance of the international community – which would naturally include the United
States – should be stimulated. Once the framework is in place, Palestinian and
Israeli citizens should be deemed mature enough politically to have a say in
the shape of a future peace. The missing link for a breakthrough is mutual
trust, political courage, an innovative approach to negotiations and respect
for public opinion. However, as the situation on the ground continues to change,
the time left to reach a viable two-state solution is quickly running out.
ã2004 Katleen Maes. All rights reserved.
ã2004 K. Diab. Unless otherwise stated, all the content on this website
is the copyright of Khaled Diab.