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Exchange of friendly fire

Anat el-Hashahar, an Israeli and founder of METalks, debates the Arab-Israeli conflict – from Oslo to Lebanon – with Khaled Diab, an Egyptian journalist and writer.

February 2007

Anat

I read through your article. It was very interesting to read... sad too. I salute you for managing to keep your optimism in the end.

Sometimes, I think that if there is cause for optimism, may be it is found in the new medium available to us here – the Internet. I have had online ‘talks’ with people from ‘the other side’, Palestinians included. It’s something that was not possible a decade ago. I am amazed by the way they think, by the way, and the disinformation that they base their views upon. At least, this is what it looks like to me, from my point of view, here. On the one hand, it’s despairing. On the other hand, as we talk, I am getting to see their point of view, and they are getting to see mine. So maybe, just maybe, if this were to happen more often, between more people, may be things will change. Who knows how many years and wars this will take, though?

You know, when I started MeTalks, I was actually amazed that such a thing didn’t already exist. But it didn’t, and it still doesn’t. May be that’s makes it important and unique enough to keep it open? What do you think?

Let me give you an Israeli perspective on your article. It’s hard to sit on my hands, and I know you don’t want me to either. While I strongly condemn Ariel Sharon’s visit to Al Aqsa (considered a stupid and provocative act by most Israelis), this was not the reason for crashing down the edifice. The reason was Yasser Arafat’s failure to take up Ehud Barak’s negotiation offers. Barak was the first Israeli statesman to have the balls, pardon the expression, to put the touchiest issues, the very core of the conflict on the table: Jerusalem and the refugees (right of return). He brought this to the discussions headed by Bill Clinton. The Israeli leftwing was in euphoria, we finally saw the light at the end of the tunnel, a chance to really bring this conflict to an end. I don’t know much, but I can assure you that Barak’s intentions were beyond honest. Then we waited for Arafat’s reply and it never came. He wouldn’t continue the negotiations. The disappointment was shattering for the Israeli left, and many supporters have come to the conclusion that we simply don’t have a partner for peace. Arafat’s response, or lack of, was what brought the peace talks to a halt. Sharon’s visit, a condemnable act by the then leader of the opposition (not an act by the government of Israel), was just the excuse that Arafat used to ignite the armed conflict again.

As for the fence – I disagree with the outline of the fence, which in places takes Palestinian land unnecessarily. Yet, I think the fence itself, as ugly as it may be, was a good thing. It really is quite simple. Palestinians were sending in suicide bombers all the time. We couldn’t live our lives like that. Can you imagine taking your family and kids to the mall in Belgium, to the cinema, going on a bus, always fearing a suicide bomber is there? That’s where we were. It had to be stopped and the ugly fence proved to be a very effective measure there.

Now, as for the unilateral withdrawal, why place the blame for the failure on Israel alone? Both sides failed to turn this into a bilateral dialogue. You know, the Israeli government was very committed to the success of this move. Sharon risked a lot by finally taking out not only the troops but the settlers as well. It was a huge thing here, politically, and many of us wondered if this was even feasible. You have no idea how difficult it was for Israeli society, threatening core values for many. The last thing Sharon/Israel wanted was for the fighting to continue. Furthermore, it was made clear that parts of the West Bank are next in line. The rightwing here was terrified.

All the Palestinians had to do was hold their fire in Gaza and not shoot Qassam rockets at our civilian towns. Is that too much to ask for, really? They could have come out with peaceful declarations, ask for help from the UN and EU in building their homes and country. We both know they would have gotten plenty of that. I do believe Israel would have contributed as well. Instead, they opted for the path of war, both in declarations and in acts.

As I said, Sharon was very committed to the move, even if only for internal political considerations. The IDF had very clear instructions on the matter: no hostile activities towards Gaza. It only held for what, days?, weeks?, before Qassam rockets were landing here again. And it’s gotten so much worse since, simply because when our troops aren’t there, it’s easier for Palestinians to smuggle in and manufacture arms. What is the lesson for us as Israelis here? To me, it’s fairly clear, as much as I am a ‘leftie’. If I don’t want Qassams on my town, we need to keep our troops in the West Bank until the Palestinians come to their senses, decide to abandon the armed struggle and turn towards peace.

The screws were tightened because that democratic choice was a Palestinian government that calls for the destruction of the state of Israel and backs it up with actions, too. You know, I always wonder. We know that the Palestinians keep smuggling in weapons and arms. That’s how they keep shooting these rockets. We’re not talking a couple of dozens of rockets, here, we’re talking many thousands. They have a sophisticated network of tunnels from Egypt into Gaza through which they smuggle the goods. Now, I always wonder, if they’re so good at smuggling arms, why can’t they smuggle in the medicine and food they claim we stop them from getting? Imagine, if Hamas would channel all of the energies it puts into fighting Israel into benefiting the people... Hence, my reservation about your description.

In your article you say that the Israeli military machine had been planning an attack against Lebanon for some months. Huh? Where did you get that? Why on earth would we be planning an attack on Lebanon? There were zero such plans. This war was 100% Hizbullah provocation. And the Israeli reaction wasn’t just about the kidnapped soldiers, it was in response to the constant firing of rockets at the north of Israel, turning over a million Israelis into refugees. I have tons of criticism about the way in which this war was carried out, but I do think this was one of those no-choice wars. We were attacked, plain and simple, and had to defend ourselves. It was casus beli, clear and simple. I can’t think of a single country in the world where a neighbouring country firing a constant barrage of rockets at civilian settlements would not generate a harsh response. How harsh? As harsh as possible to deter such actions from happening again.

There was also a lot of destruction in Israel, by the way – admittedly, more so in Lebanon then here. Sue us for being strong, where military weakness in this region would have meant the end of this country. Something Hizbullah should have kept in mind before they started. I think the deterrence worked, by the way. I have a feeling Hizbullah would not rush into another such adventure anytime soon, which is all we ever wanted to prevent anyway. The cluster bombs were a huge mistake, in my opinion, so you can put the blame on Israel for these.

Khaled

Thank you for taking the time to give me your Israeli perspective. I think we should all be saluted for daring to dream of an alternative and caring enough to sympathise with the other side.

I found your political comments interesting. There were many reasons for the breakdown of the Oslo Accords, on both the Palestinian and Israeli side. But the main cause was the failure of the accords to stick to the timetable. Palestinian extremist groups were wrong to continue attacks against Israeli civilians, but the way to make Israeli civilians safe would have been to press ahead with the talks and finalise them, rather than becoming too fixated solely on security issues. A Palestinian state would’ve made Israel safer than any security measure – but the political elite bucked at making the necessary territorial concessions, particularly given the vociferous ideological settler community. The disillusionment felt by the utter lack of progress over the Oslo years, and the realities created on the ground by the accelerated settlement building (engineered by the Oslo saboteur Ariel Sharon when he was housing minister) fuelled the hatred.

As for Barak’s ‘generous’ offer, I won’t bore you with my opinion, but you said you wanted to do some reading around the issues. As an Israeli, it is important for you to get a non-partisan view on Barak’s handling of the talks. Here is an interesting article which appeared in the New York Times written by an adviser of Clinton’s who attended the negotiations.

Fictions about the failure at Camp David

As for your position on the Lebanon war, I am disappointed that, after all this time debating non-violence, you advocate and justify an act of aggression. I understand that things looked scary from inside Israel, but governments tend to misinform their citizens during times of conflict to try to win their support - there was a lot of disinformation flying around inside Israel. Numerous credible sources point to the fact that this attack on Lebanon had been in the planning for a year and Israel already had Washington’s tacit approval before it attacked. Besides, the war in Lebanon did absolutely nothing to make Israel safer or destroy Hizbullah. Instead, it led to more vilification of the country in the region. Talks with Lebanon could’ve achieved more (direct and through the USA and EU), especially since the Hizb was under a lot of domestic pressure to disarm.

For more on this, check out.

Watching Lebanon by Seymour Hirsh in the New Yorker

Israel sets war plan more than a year ago (San Francisco Chronicle)

Anat

During the Oslo process, Arafat and his people were either incapable of controlling the extremists or they didn’t want to. There was no reason for us to think that his regime would become more willing/capable if it were given a state – they might have, then again, they might have let the extremists go on with their acts. A gamble, for sure. I used to advocate taking the gamble. You know, it just occurred to me that having children to look after makes taking the gamble less attractive.

I am not sure anymore that a Palestinian state would have made Israel safer. I used to think so, but I’m not sure I do anymore. Israel is a democracy and the political elite changes from time to time. Back then, it was Barak and the labour party – secular, liberal and not very attached to the West Bank. Yes, the settlers are a huge issue, but Gaza was a good test case in that sense. It was amazingly hard, yet it was done. We actually had a rare moment in history back then, with Barak taking the plunge. Had Arafat said yes to continued negotiations, Barak would have moved forward towards making the territorial concessions.

I agree with you about the disillusionment. I just blame both sides for the lack of progress. The Palestinians should have reined in their extremists and prevent the suicide bombers. Yes, this is the Israeli point of view I am representing here, but to us, it was the wave after wave of terror attacks that put a halt to the peace process. I think the Palestinians had every reason to be upset about the expansion of settlements and about 1,001 things the Israeli occupation did. Sending in suicide bombers was not the answer, though, and I'm sure you agree. Arafat should have put an end to this, and he didn’t, and it stifled the peace process.

Khaled

This is turning into quite a debate! As you can see, I can’t sit on my hands either! It’s fascinating for me to hear things from your angle. I find getting the privilege to look through the eyes of someone else helps expand my horizons.

You misunderstand what I have written in various articles regarding Lebanon. I never claimed that Israel ‘started’ the war. For me, that is a moot point. What I was trying to highlight is that Israel has been itching for a while to attack Hizbullah, as was demonstrated by the fact that senior members of the Israeli brass went to Washington months before the Hizbullah abductions and that Israel didn’t even give the diplomatic option the time of day. Even if there were no premeditation, the central tenet of my thesis still stands: such a phenomenonal show of disproportionate force does not serve Israel’s interests in the slightest. On the contrary, as this and other conflicts, current and past, in the Middle East amply demonstrate, war achieves little but pain and misery.

Your idea that Israel gained something from blowing Lebanon to smithereens surprises me, as does the extent of your disillusionment – believing that a Palestinian state will have solved nothing and defending the kind of vengeance we need to end in order to make progress. Even if the war weakened Hizbullah’s capacity, this will probably be only temporary, but the hatred and anger it has evoked will be long term. Like you yourself admitted, Hizbullah probably had no intention of going to war with Israel. Had Israel talked tough and demanded, through regional and diplomatic channels, the return of its soldiers and the cessation of further Hizb attacks, it would’ve avoided the rocket attacks on northern Israel and won respect internationally for exercising restraint. The same applies to its tough handling of Gaza. What it managed was to elicit international shock and disdain.

In addition, as I have argued before, Israel’s so-called ‘deterrent posture’ is fatally flawed. Even if using overwhelming force staves off attacks for a while, the grievances created by all the devastation and destruction will come back to haunt Israel in the future as a new generation grows up to hate the country. If Israel wants to be accepted by its neighbours, acting like the neighbourhood tough guy won’t achieve it. Now, if I were a wise, elder Israeli statesman, I would’ve made a lot of diplomatic noise at every possible local and international forum. And, if a military option were eventually to become necessary, I would have ordered surgical commando strikes against actual Hizbullah targets, not punished the entire Lebanese population (especially the hard-pressed shia’a).

Now, as peace activists, I think we should be condemning both Hizbullah’s stupid provocation and Israel’s idiotic and destructive military adventure - not justifying it as a 'no-choice' conflict. The eye-for-an-eye cycle needs to be broken, otherwise the bloodshed will continue indefinitely and your boys, whom you fear will have to go to the army and become embroiled in a future battle, may well do so. We owe it to ourselves and future generations to condemn all violence in our region and not excuse it. Your views on the negotiations with Barak are thought-provoking and I will have to go away and mull over them.

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ã2007 K. Diab. Unless otherwise stated, all the content on this website is the copyright of Khaled Diab.

Fictions about the failure at Camp David

Further reading

The EU’s new Palestine dilemma

Dressed to kill –

Under the cloak of Bush’s foreign policy

December 2005 – Jeff Sommers, Khaled Diab and Charles Woolfson expose what lies beneath the cloak of US President George W Bush’s foreign policy. Read on