Outcomes
of the unexpected
September 2005
For the first time since Egypt became a
republic 53 years ago, Egyptians have been invited to choose their president
through a multiple-choice election, rather than a take-it-or-leave-it
referendum. And although outwardly the election campaign, with its 10
mud-slinging candidates and tough talking, resembles the real McAhmed, almost
everyone is certain that Hosni Mubarak will pass this exam with flying colours.
Most people regard the elections as merely
cosmetic – “some top-down touches of make-up to the ugly face of the regime”,
as veteran human rights campaigner and prominent member of the opposition
umbrella movement Aida Seif al-Dawla put it to me.
“I'm on a long holiday,” a journalist
from a newspaper in a bit of hot water for its racy pre-election coverage told
me. “Maybe it’s better that way: the elections are far too farcical, don’t you
think?”
One would have to be a reckless gambler,
indeed, to put any money on the incumbent losing the presidential elections.
With or without electoral sleights of hand, our veteran leader will almost
certainly win. Not only has he been taking private lessons at the hands of the
best spin doctors in how to win friends and influence his people, he has the
additional advantages of face recognition, a quarter of a century of proven
experience, weak opposition candidates, and a very short election race.
In the balance of things, many Egyptians think
his never-ending tenure hasn’t been all that bad, despite the stagnation,
repression of serious opposition and a culture of human rights abuses against
those who step too far out of line. In a region going up in smoke and gradually
being subsumed by the flames of conflict, stability –some might call it
stagnation – is a precious commodity valued by Egyptians.
As if that wasn’t enough and despite
reassurances that this will be a clean and fair race, many people are afraid
they may get caught by the shrapnel caused by a blast from the past, when the
government was less tolerant of dissent. Some are afraid to voice open
criticism of Mubarak, while others think that the authorities somehow have ways
of finding out how you voted in the secret ballot – two useful myths to
perpetuate, if you want a low turnout and voter apathy.
The opposition candidates are putting up their
best fight, despite their miniscule resources and fairly small support base.
Mubarak’s most serious and vocal contender, Ayman Nour (41) of the al-Ghad
party has been out campaigning among the people, holding rallies and mobilising
young militants. His party’s campaign newspaper – which costs 24 piastres, one
for every year Mubarak has been in office – promises to uncover the current
regime’s cronyism and corruption.
Noaman Gomaa (71), the Wafd Party’s chair, has
launched a controversial campaign that sympathises with the Egyptian people’s
apparent sense that “we are suffocating”. However, the fossilised and aloof
party chair, is going for an image modelled on the legendary Egyptian
independence leader Saad Zaghloul in his campaign which shows that he may be a
21st century politician but his heart is in the Egypt of 1919.
While Zaghloul garners a lot of respect among
Egyptians, people need something more immediate and accessible. But Gomaa does
not do access very well. He does not appear all that willing to meet his
electorate and launched his campaign not with a popular rally, like Nour did,
but with a televised address from his ivory tower somewhere above people’s
heads.
That said, there is an incidental symmetry
between the early 21st century and the early 20th century
that the Wafd Party leadership pines for. In 1919, Egypt’s disparate political
forces came together and formed an umbrella known as the Wafd (Delegation) to
demand independence from the British. Today, disparate political forces –
leftists, Nasserists, liberals, Islamists, secularist – joined together under
the umbrella of the Kifaya! (Enough!) movement to demand political reform.
Mubarak has been skillfully blowing hot and
cold over the past quarter of a century in his bid to retain control and fend
off challenges to his authority. Aware that he is facing growing popular
opposition, particularly from Egypt’s rapidly radicalising youth, his calling
of multi-candidate elections is a deft, if desperate, ruse to take the wind out
of the sails of the burgeoning opposition movements by giving his regime’s
democratic credentials a desperately needed facelift.
This was particularly important after the
political regression that accompanied economic stagnation in recent years,
reversing many of the advances made in the 1980s and much of the 1990s. “In
many ways, the current election is about ‘official’ or ‘political’ Egypt
catching up with the rapidly changing mentalities of many Egyptians,” wrote
Tarek Atia in Al Ahram Weekly. “2005 is just a dress rehearsal for a
more real election next time, in 2011.”
Political expert Marina Ottaway, in her book Democracy
Challenged (2003), describes Egypt as the text-book example of a
semi-authoritarian regime in equilibrium: giving just enough political ground
and achieving just enough economic and social progress to keep the masses
quiet. But this equilibrium is being upset.
Mubarak’s adroit juggling and playing off of
various forces against one another seems to be running to the end of its useful
life. There comes a point where a simmering cauldron will overflow. Mubarak
seems to have released the genie from the bottle and even a man of his caution
and careful planning cannot anticipate what the public will do with this new
spirit – if not this year, then six years from now.
“Direct presidential elections are not a
magnanimous nor ‘astute’ gesture by Mubarak, but a huge, reluctant concession…
Most unwillingly, Mubarak is actually abetting the rapid deterioration of the
mystique surrounding the Egyptian president,” noted a blogger who calls herself
(or himself) Baheya.
In recent years, the president has experienced
a meteoric fall from grace. Egyptians may have a legendary level of patience,
but even they are tiring of a leader who has been in office for longer than
many of them have been alive. His excuses for not reforming no longer cut much
mustard with a growing proportion of the population and the stagnating economy
has made too many people – particularly the young and prospect-light – feel the
pinch where it hurts.
In addition, Egypt’s perceived inability to
deliver its full weight on the regional and global stage, and the public
perception of the government being a client regime of the United States, has
hurt national self-esteem. And, what had begun as a pro-Palestinian and then
anti-Iraq war movement, quickly escalated into an anti-regime platform.
One of the first steps Mubarak took to stave
off the increasingly iconoclastic opposition movement was to sideline
reluctantly many of the most disliked old guard, such as former Information
Minister Safwat al-Sharif and former Prime Minsiter Atef Obeid, in the cabinet
reshuffle two years ago. As if to symbolise a dirt-free and more competent
image, his choice of prime minister fell on Ahmed Nazif, whose surname,
incidentally, means ‘clean’.
In fact, as a sign of how much the old façade
is crumbling, corruption allegations have been flying left, right and centre
this week against former editor-in-chief of Al Ahram, the Middle East’s
biggest newspaper group, Ibrahim Nafie who, despite being the regime’s biggest
cheerleader, was unceremoniously ousted into early retirement last year.
The popular expectation that Mubarak will win
breeds a certain amount of apathy. “[People] continue their lives and they will
only talk about [the elections] when you ask…. Till now, I have not met a
single Egyptian who is actually going to vote,” a European friend living in
Cairo said.
According to popular perceptions, both within
and outside Egypt, Egyptians are a politically docile people. “The Political Apathy
Party… enjoys an overwhelming majority in Egypt,” wrote Khaled al-Shami in the
London-based al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper.
Many reasons have been put forward for this
apparent passivity but there is an undeniable alienation between government and
people – not to mention a fear of authority. Perhaps after six millennia or
more of centralised government, Egyptians have seen too many rulers come and go
– they have become used to letting government do its thing, while they get on
with their own. Less poetically, perhaps it is the gritty realism that puts the
bread and butter issues of economic survival, in many people’s minds, above
haughty principles of individual rights.
In addition, Mubarak may be the top dog, but he
is by no means unique. Millions of families and offices around the country have
their own mini Mubarak who does not tolerate any challenges to his hegemony or
authority. When too many parents raise their children to be subservient,
teachers put them down, and the army and employers sap them of their remaining
individuality, perhaps their reluctance to rebel against the regime becomes
less surprising.
This apparent apathy is borne out by the
figures: the 2000 parliamentary election saw an estimated turnout of just 20%,
according to NDP figures. This shows that Egyptians have little faith in their
democratic institutions – they know real power lies elsewhere. But then that is
a growing global malaise of low voter turnout.
“When the US constitution was drafted,
representative democracy was a radical and thrilling idea. Now it is an object
of suspicion and even contempt, as people all over the world recognise that it
allows us to change the management but not the firm,” wrote George Monbiot, a
columnist in the UK’s Guardian newspaper.
One obstacle to reform has been the lack of a
viable opposition other than the Muslim Brotherhood. “Political Islam is now
the ideology of the opposition in Egypt,” Ottaway wrote. “In an earlier period,
before socialism waned as an ideology, such economic decline [as Egypt is
experiencing] would have spawned a leftist political movement.”
In addition, the shutting down and
marginalising of popular secular political outlets and the tacit promotion of
the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups by the late President Anwar
al-Sadat to counterbalance his socialist and Nasserist opponents helped them
take root. Ironically, he signed his own death warrant by supporting and then
clamping down hard on them.
“The presence of radical Islamist fringe
groups, as well as uncertainty about the true intentions of the Muslim
Brotherhood, creates a climate in which not only the regime… but also moderate
Muslims and Coptic Christians have reason to be deeply concerned about the
outcomes of truly free and fair elections,” Ottaway concludes.
Although the Brotherhood claims an active
membership of 2 million, not to mention 3 million passive supporters, they have
been Egypt’s uncrowned kings ever since the movement was founded by Hassan
al-Banna in the 1920s. This is partly because of continuous government
oppression and sidelining that started with King Farouq and continues to this
day.
But I believe that, even if they had the chance
at the ballot box, Egyptians would not hand over the country in its entirety to
the Brotherhood. With its profound commitment to social justice, the
organisation functions as a good grassroots body to help the poor, oppressed
and needy.
The Brotherhood – which includes intellectuals,
scientists, disenchanted secular radicals and professionals – believes in the
value of science and seek to live by a strict Islamic moral and social code.
“The Muslim Brotherhood has striven, since its inception, to renew Islam… while
striving to absorb contemporary sciences and cultures and preserving
fundamentals and identity,” the organisation’s website explains. Many Egyptians
fear that this prescribed model for society could prove too puritanical and
stifling.
But, as this election is proving, a nascent secular
opposition movement is emerging. It is an interesting coincidence that its most
prominent figure is Ayman Nour, whose surname means ‘light’ of the al-Ghad
(Tomorrow) party. He is the youngest presidential candidate and his party is
Egypt’s youngest officially recognised one.
Although I know little about his politics and I
am not in favour of too much economic liberalism, he offers hope for the
future. His party’s choice of name indicates that it is a forward-looking and
ambitious organisation (with its eyes firmly set on 2011), while the other main
opposition parties are stuck in the past. The Wafd can’t get beyond its moment
of glory in the early 20th century, while the Muslim Brotherhood’s
has one eye cast hundreds of years back to a golden age that cannot be
facsimiled.
Nour is a civilian. He is young. He is
energetic. And he seems to have fresh ideas. Despite being seriously
underfunded, his campaign has been more successful than anyone could have foreseen.
He has been tirelessly travelling up and down the country by bus and train –
Mubarak and Noeman have been flying – and has reached spots the other
candidates have failed to.
He seems to have overcome the Egyptian
political elite’s aversion to getting down among the masses and dirtying their
hands. He has been campaigning in some of Egypt’s poorest and most neglected
villages in Upper Egypt.
Now, it may be time to think the unthinkable.
What if the sleeping giant of the popular will were to awaken to have the last
laugh on Wednesday 7 September and oust Mubarak. What would happen then? Would
Mubarak drop the pretence of democracy and employ strongman tactics to reverse
the result or would he concede defeat gracefully? Would the army and security
services tolerate a new president? Would it be the dawn of Egyptian democracy
or would the country, with its weak institutions, regress? Would a new leader
help democratise the country further or would he try to consolidate his grip on
power like the leaders that went before him?
Can Egypt ever have a meaningful democracy
while its society is so polarised economically and educationally? Egypt is
unlikely to have a democracy in the European sense of the word, at least in the
near future. That kind of political equality exists in societies that have
achieved a large measure of social and economic egalitarianism – literacy is at
almost 100% and more than three-quarters of northern Europeans belong to a
middle class.
If we look back at European experiments, one
can see that democracy evolves. In Belgium, for instance, people used to have
votes according to their wealth in the 19th century and universal
suffrage was a 20th century innovation. As the history of successful
democracies shows, democratic rights are almost always acquired and rarely
granted. Democratisation is a gradual process of give and take, and occasional
clashing, which can take decades and even centuries. But, ultimately, it is up
to the people to decide. And the Egyptian people are patient enough to see the
process through.
ã2005 K. Diab. Unless otherwise stated, all the content on this website
is the copyright of Khaled Diab.